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Atomism, Causalism and the Existence of a First Cause  






The theorizing about causation is perhaps as old as philosophy itself. More specifically, 
arguments for the existence of a first cause have a long and rich history
1
. Ever since Plato 
philosophers developed first cause arguments. Well-known examples from philosophical 
tradition include Aristotle’s argument in Physics and Metaphysics for the existence of a 
first unmoved mover, the second of the ‘Five Ways’ of Aquinas in the Summa 
Theologiae and Leibniz’s argument for the existence of a necessary being that accounts 
for the existence of the universe as a whole
2
. With the rise of positivism in the second 
part of the nineteenth century and the decline of metaphysics that went with it, the 
interest in first cause arguments fade away. However, the last decennia of the twentieth 
century witnessed a ‘resurgence of metaphysics’ (Craig and Moreland 2009)
3
. The recent 
revival of interest in first cause arguments (Alexander 2008) can be understood against 
this background. Several new first cause arguments have been developed, notably those 
by Koons (1997), Gale and Pruss (1999) and Rasmussen (2010). This paper provides a 
new first cause argument by showing that atomism, i.e. the thesis that each composite 
object is composed of simple objects, together with causalism, understood in this paper 
as the thesis that every object is a cause or has a cause
4
, logically imply the existence of a 
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first cause if some additional general premises regarding the interplay between parthood, 
composition and causation are accepted. Thus it is shown that a commitment to atomism, 
causalism and the additional premises result in a commitment to there being a first cause. 
The paper starts with some required preliminary stage setting. Next a number of 
definitions and two basic principles regarding the mereological nature of parthood and 
composition are presented. Subsequently the additional premises of the new argument are 
introduced and the conclusion that there is a first cause is logically derived from them. 
The paper ends with a justification of the new argument’s premises. The justification of 
some of them appeals to the aforementioned two principles. Although the present paper 
provides a new first cause argument, its aim is not particularly to argue for the existence 
of a first cause, but, instead, to show that, under some very generic and sensible 
conditions on parthood, composition and causation, one cannot reasonably be both an 




The argument presented in this paper does not rely on the principle of sufficient reason, 
that is, the principle that there is an explanation for every contingent truth. Second, it 
does not depend on any weaker variant of this principle either, such as the restricted 
variants of Gale and Pruss (1999) and Pruss (2004)
6
. Third, the first cause argument as 
proposed in this paper does not depend on the presumption that every contingent object 
has a cause for its existence. Furthermore, fourth, it does not rely on any weaker variant 
of this presumption, such as the restricted variants of Koons (1997) and Rasmussen 
(2010)
7
. Fifth, the proposed new argument does not depend on the notions of necessary 
truths and contingent truths. In addition, sixth, the argument does not rely on the notions 
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of necessarily existing and continently existing objects either. Hence, the new argument 
as proposed in this paper does not depend on any metaphysical modal notion or principle. 
In this respect it is entirely different from the aforementioned contemporary first cause 
arguments of Koons, Gale and Pruss, and Rasmussen, which all do in fact rely upon 
metaphysical modal concepts and corresponding metaphysical modal principles. 
  
Stage setting 
Some initial stage setting is indispensable before the new first cause argument can be 
advanced. First, in this paper anything that exists is called an object and an object is 
something that exists. There may be different kinds of objects, e.g. abstract objects in 
addition to concrete objects, and universal objects in addition to particular objects. Still, 
discerning kinds of objects is not relevant for the proposed argument: a first cause, if it 
exists, is an object of some kind. Second, for this paper causality is plausibly understood 
as a relationship between two objects: the cause and the effect. Thus this paper adopts an 
objectual, i.e. object oriented, conception of causality according to which causation is a 
two-place relation whose relata are objects. Third, the concept of causation as deployed 
in this paper is limited to causation with respect to bringing about something’s existence. 
In what follows an object is thus understood to be the cause of another object if and only 
if the former object brings the latter into existence. In other words, some object causes 
another object in case it is the cause of the existence of that other object. Fourth, for this 
paper a first cause is defined as an uncaused cause whose effect is ontologically prior
8
 to 
every other caused object. From this definition it follows immediately that there can be at 
most one first cause. After all, suppose to the contrary that there is more than one first 
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cause. Let A and B both be first causes. In that case, since A is a first cause, the effect of 
A is ontologically prior to the effect of B. Now, because B is a first cause as well, the 
effect of B is ontologically prior to the effect of A, which contradicts the asymmetry of 
being ontologically prior. Thus, indeed only one object can be a first cause. So, if there is 
a first cause, it is properly described as the ultimate origin of all other objects. Fifth, the 
new argument is deductive in nature. The conclusion that a first cause exists follows 
logically from the premises, that is, if the premises are true than the claim that there is a 
first cause is also true. 
 
Parthood and composition 
The proposed new first cause argument consists of six premises and one conclusion, i.e. 
the conclusion that there is a first cause. Before the argument is presented the nature of 
parthood and composition on which the justification of some of its premises is based has 
to be clarified. For that some mereological definitions are required. In this paper the 
notion of parthood is taken to be a relationship between two objects. One object can be a 
part of another object. Parthood is taken to be a basic concept and thus not definable in 
terms of other more basic concepts. Object A is called a proper part of object B if and 
only if A is a part of B and A is not equal to B. Object A is called an improper part of 
object B in case A is equal to B. Further, object A is said to contain object B if and only 
if B is a part of A. Another mereological concept employed in this paper is the concept of 
disjointness. Disjointness is defined here in terms of parthood. Two objects are disjoint in 
case they do not share a (proper or improper) part. Further, the sum of two or more 
objects is a concept to denote the totality of those objects, i.e. those objects taken 
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together. A composite object, also called a composite, is an object that has at least one 
proper part. Now, a simple object, also called a simple, a mereological atom, or an atom, 
is an object lacking proper parts. So, a simple object is not a composite object and a 
composite is not a simple. Obviously, every object is either a simple or a composite. 
Another relevant mereological concept is that of composition. Composition is not the 
same concept as the concept of sum. Some objects {Oi}i compose an object O if and only 
if object O is the sum of the Oi and all the Oi are mutually disjoint (Sider 1993). In 
addition, some objects {Oi}i  are called a composition of an object O in case the {Oi}i 
compose O. Note that a composite can have more than one composition. Now, the nature 
of parthood and composition on which the justification of some of the premises of the 
new argument is based accords with two mereological principles: ‘supplementation’ and 
‘composition-as-identity’. Both principles are clarified below. 
 
Supplementation 
The supplementation principle states that every proper part of an object is ‘supplemented’ 
by another disjoint part of that object (Varzi 2009). From this principle it immediately 
follows that every composite object has a composition consisting of two or more objects. 
 
Composition-as-Identity 
As mentioned before the sum of some objects is those objects taken together, i.e. the sum 
of some objects is a term to refer to those objects as a totality. A sum is thus ontologically 
neutral, innocent or harmless, that is, the sum of some objects introduces nothing beyond 
these objects themselves. Thus, a commitment to sums is not a further commitment, since 
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sums are nothing over and above their objects. Now, compositions are sums. This implies 
that the same holds for the ontological relation between an object and its compositions, 
i.e., if some objects compose an object, then that composed object is those objects taken 
together. Thus, the composite simply is the composition. This principle is often referred 
to in the literature as composition-as-identity (Koslicki 2008). It should not be confused 
with mereological universalism. According to mereological universalism every arbitrary 
sum of objects is itself an object. Composition-as-identity does not imply universalism. 
After all, even if all composites are identical to their compositions, it might be the case 
that some sums are not objects, e.g. because these sums do not stand in the proper causal 
relationships with other objects
9
. Further, universalism does not imply composition-as-
identity, because, even if all sums are objects, it might be the case that composites are 
something above and beyond their compositions. The proposed new argument is based on 
composition-as-identity. However, the new argument does not assume universalism. In 
fact, universalism is a quite implausible position. Surely, the sum of some piece of wood 
in Italy, the left front wheel of some car and the Statue of Liberty does not count itself as 
an object. It is a sum of objects and nothing more. For amongst others, it was not caused 




Mereological universalism is also referred to as unrestricted composition. The denial of 
universalism is either nihilism or restricted composition. According to nihilism sums of 
two or more objects are not objects. Nihilism therefore implies that composition does not 
occur. Restricted composition is a position between nihilism and universalism. According 
to restricted composition some sums are objects and some sums are not. It is important to 
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note that restricted composition does not imply that there are only a few concise natural 
necessary and sufficient conditions for composition to occur. After all, for all we know it 
might be a brute fact that some sums are objects and other sums are not. So, the cases in 
which composition occur might be quite irregular. In other words, restricted composition 
does not imply that the Special Composition Question
11
, i.e. the question under what 
circumstances some objects compose a further object, has a concise natural answer
12
. The 
defense of one of the premises of the new argument is based upon the acceptance of the 
following sufficient condition for composition to occur: some objects compose another 
object if they together make up a “demarcated natural kind”. This sufficient condition is 
explained and argued for later on in this paper. Note that the validity of this (or any other) 
sufficient condition for composition to occur does not imply that the Special Composition 
Question has a concise natural answer. As becomes clear later on, the proposed argument 
does not depend on this question having a concise natural answer.  
 
The argument  
After these preliminary remarks, definitions and basic principles the six premises and the 
conclusion of the new argument can be presented. They are enumerated in the list below. 
 
1. There are objects, 
2. Every composite object is ultimately composed of simple objects (atomism), 
3. Every object is caused or13 is the cause of one or more other objects (causalism), 
4. The sum of all caused simple objects, if not empty14, is an object, 
5. The cause of an object is disjoint with that object, 
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6. Every caused composite object contains a caused proper part, 
7. There is a first cause (conclusion). 
 
Below a logical derivation of the conclusion from the premises is provided, that is, it is 
shown that if the premises are true, the conclusion, that there is a first cause, is true as 
well. The derivation of the conclusion consists of five main steps. First, from (2) and (6) 
a principle is derived, i.e. the principle that every caused composite contains a caused 
simple. Second, this principle is used to infer that the sum of all caused simples, denoted 
by M, is an object. Third, it is shown that M is not a cause. Hence, according to premise 
(3), M is caused by some object A. Fourth, it is shown that object A is itself uncaused, 
and, fifth, it is shown that object A is in fact a first cause (and thus the unique first cause). 
 
First step: Every caused composite contains a caused simple 
Now, as stated, the first step is to show that premise (2) and (6) together imply that every 
caused composite object contains a caused simple object, i.e. that each caused composite 
has at least one caused simple as a part. In what follows this metaphysical principle is 
referred to as principle (p). To show that principle (p) indeed holds, let C be a caused 
composite object and consider the following step by step algorithmic procedure: 
 
1) Let i := 0 and C(0) := C, 
2) According to the sixth premise C(i) contains a caused proper part C(i+1), 
3) If C(i+1) is a simple object, then STOP the procedure, 
4) Let i := i+1 and proceed with the second step. 
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, … does not proceed to infinity, i.e., 
there is a natural number n such that C
(n) 
is a caused simple object. Due to the transitivity 
of the part-of relation, it follows that C
(n) 
is a part of C. Thus, C contains a caused simple 
object. So, (p) is derived. 
 
Second step: The sum of all simples (called M) is an object 
It is shown that the sum of all caused simple objects is an object. Let M be the sum of all 
caused simple objects. According to premise (1) there is an object. Premise (3) implies 
that this object is caused or the cause of another object. So, in any case, there is a caused 
object N. Object N is simple or composite. It is now shown that in both cases M is not 
empty. If N is simple, then N is a caused simple, and thus M is not empty. If N is 
composite, then, according to principle (p), N contains a caused simple object, and thus 
M is not empty. It follows that in both cases M is not empty. Therefore, since one of both 
cases obtains, M is not empty.  But then premise (4) implies that M is an object. 
 
Third step: M is not a cause 
It is shown that M is not a cause. Suppose, for reductio, that M is the cause of another 
object, i.e. K. According to premise (5) object M is disjoint with object K. Thus, K is not 
a caused simple. Object K is a caused composite. From principle (p) it follows that K 




 is a part of M. From this it follows immediately 
that M and K share K
*
 as a part. But this is contradictory since M and K are disjoint. So, 
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the assumption that M is the cause of one or more other objects needs to be rejected. 
Object M is not a cause. 
 
Fourth step: The cause of M (called A) is uncaused 
According to premise (3) M is caused. Let object A be the cause of M. It is now shown 
that A is uncaused. Suppose, again for reductio, that A is caused. From premise (5) it 
follows that A and M are disjoint. So, A is not a caused simple, i.e. A is a caused 
composite. Principle (p) then implies that A has a caused simple A
*
 as one of its parts. 
So, the objects A and M share A
*
 as part. But this is surely in conflict with the 
disjointness of A and M. Therefore, the assumption that A is caused is incorrect. Object 
A is uncaused.  
 
Fifth step: A is a first cause 
Now, object A is the uncaused cause of the sum of all caused simples, i.e. M. Does it 
follow that A is a first cause? To show that A is indeed a first cause it also needs to be 
demonstrated that the effect of A, that is M, is ontologically prior to every other caused 
object. Thus, let B be a caused object. In that case B is either a caused simple or a caused 
composite. Principle (p) implies that in either case B has at last one caused simple as a 
part. But then M is indeed ontologically prior to B. So it follows that A is a first cause. 
 
In defense of the premises 
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The above shows that the new argument is valid, that is, the conclusion that there is a first 
cause follows logically from the premises. Now, are there good reasons to think that the 
premises are true? In what follows a justification of each of the six premises is provided. 
 
Premise (1): There are objects 
The first premise seems to be evident. Surely there are objects. The claim that there are 
objects is so much obvious that it is not even clear how to derive this claim from claims 
that are intuitively more evident than the claim to be argued for. This shows that the first 
premise is sufficiently plausible. One could argue that the premise that there are objects is 
an empirical datum. If so, the argument is a posteriori. On the other hand one could argue 
that the claim that there are objects is to such an extent basic or fundamental that it is 
more properly described as being an a priori principle. After all, is there being at least one 
object not a necessary condition for the activity of rational discourse itself? If so, the truth 
of the first premise is already taken for granted once one starts to consider the plausibility 
of that premise, i.e. without objects there would be no question of whether the first 
premise is plausible and thus that very question implies that premise (1) is true. 
 
Premise (2): Every composite object is ultimately composed of simple objects 
This premise is known as atomism. A full thorough defense of atomism is surely beyond 
the scope of the present paper. In what follows an initial justification of atomism is given 
by providing a response to Schaffer’s criticism of atomism (Schaffer 2003). Schaffer 
argues that there is no evidence in favor of atomism
15
. He first discusses and justifiably 
rejects some a priori arguments for atomism (2003, pp. 501-502). After that he rejects the 
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view that science indicates atomism (2003, pp. 502-505). The view that science indicates 
atomism is understood by him as the claim that somewhere in the future there will be a 
complete microphysics that postulates mereological atoms. He rejects this claim because, 
according to him, there is not a good reason to assume that there will ever be a complete 
microphysics, let alone one that postulates atoms. Now, Schaffer correctly rejects this 
claim. There are indeed no good reasons to claim that there will ever be a complete 
microphysics that postulates atoms. However, this claim is not the only rendering of the 
view that science indicates atomism. Here a Quinean rendering is proposed according to 
which it is justified to commit to the ontology presupposed by our best scientific theories, 
particularly physics. Thus, following this dictum, since physics presumes the existence of 
a fundamental level of basic building blocks (nowadays ‘strings’), it is justified to accept 
atomism as a premise. In fact, a fundamental level of basic entities is presupposed by all 
mainstream microphysical theories developed in the past 200 years or so, which makes a 
commitment to atomism perhaps somewhat more justified than if only the latest generally 
accepted physical theory would presuppose a fundamental level of basic building blocks. 
 
In what follows a second argument for atomism is provided. This argument is not found 
in Schaffer (2003). In order to present this argument some additional terminology is 
needed. Assume a formal additive measure of being that measures the amount of being 
contained in each object. Let O be an object and denote the amount of being contained in 
object O by being(O). Thus, being(O) is zero in case there is no object O. Now, let the 
objects {Oi}i  compose object O. Hence {Oi}i is a composition of O. The additive nature 
of the involved measure implies by definition that being({Oi}i) = ∑ i [being(Oi)]. Now, 
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according to the principle of composition-as-identity, object O simply is the objects {Oi}i 
taken together, that is, object O is nothing above or beyond the objects {Oi}i taken as a 
totality. From this it follows that being(O) = ∑ i [being(Oi)]. Next, let O be an object and 
let Ω and Ω* be two different compositions of O such that every object in Ω* is either 
equal to or a part of an object in Ω. In that case Ω* is called a refinement of Ω. It follows 
that being(Ω) = [being(Ω) – being(Ω*)] + being(Ω*). This formula indicates that the 
amount of being at a certain level of composition is the arithmetical sum of the amount of 
being at the previous level and the incremental amount between both levels. Now, let 
{Ωn}n be a sequence of compositions of object O such that for all natural numbers n 
composition Ωn+1 is a refinement of composition Ωn. The sequence {Ωn}n is either finite 
or infinite. Suppose first that {Ωn}n is finite and let ΩN denote the final composition in the 
sequence. It follows that being(O) = ∑ (n=1 to n=N) [being(Ωn-1) - being(Ωn)] + being(ΩN). 
How should this arithmetical formula be adapted to the case that {Ωn}n is infinite? This 
case is obtained if N proceeds to infinity and the final composition ΩN vanishes from the 
sequence. Hence, the only natural answer appears to be that in that case one obtains the 
formula being(O) = ∑ (n=1 to n=∞) [being(Ωn-1) - being(Ωn)]. After these remarks the second 
argument for atomism can be provided. Suppose, for reductio, that atomism is false. In 
that case there is a composite object C that is not composed of simple objects. Due to the 
principle of supplementation C is composed of two or more other objects. So, there is a 
composition of C. Now, since C is not composed of simple objects there is an infinite 
sequence of compositions {Ωn}n of C such that for every natural number n composition 
Ωn+1 is a refinement of composition Ωn. Because of the aforementioned observations it 
follows that being(C) = ∑ (n=1 to n=∞) [being(Ωn-1) - being(Ωn)]. Further, the principle of 
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composition-as-identity implies that being(C) = being(Ωn-1) and being(C) = being(Ωn). 
Hence, for all natural numbers n, it follows that being(Ωn-1) - being(Ωn) = 0. This implies 
that being(C) = ∑ (n=1 to n=∞) [being(Ωn-1) - being(Ωn)] = ∑ (n=1 to n=∞) [0] = 0. But then 
being(C) = 0 which by definition implies that there is no object C. This however directly 
contradicts with the fact that C exists. Thus, the initial assumption that atomism is false 
needs to be rejected. Atomism is true. As mentioned earlier Schaffer (2003) does not 
contain this argument. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, he agrees that the assumption that ‘there 
are no composite macroentities at all but only fundamental entities in various arrange-
ments’ (2003, p. 509) together with a commitment to infinite descent ‘would have the 
absurd consequence that all objects would dissolve into thin air’ (2003, p. 509). In this 
respect Schaffer approvingly cites R.W. Sperry (1976) who writes: ‘The reductionist 
approach that would always explain the whole in terms of the parts leads to an infinite 
regress in which eventually everything is held to be explainable in terms of essentially 
nothing’ (citation from Schaffer 2003, p. 515). But, this is of course the main point of the 
second argument provided above! The reality of an object inducing an infinite regress of 
compositions would indeed, so to speak, be left hanging in the air. Its existence would not 
truly obtain, that is, the idea of that object actually being there would be a sheer delusion. 
Its existence would be an illusory fantasy. So, each sequence of downward compositions 
for a given object indeed terminates, which is precisely the main conclusion of the second 
argument. Note that ‘the reductionist approach that would always explain the whole in 
terms of the parts’ is basically the same assumption as composition-as-identity. Thus, it 
might be the case that Schaffer, in the light of his approval of Sperry’s point, avoids a 
commitment to atomism by withholding himself from a commitment to composition-as-
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identity. If so, it may be concluded that Schaffer actually accepts that composition-as-
identity implies atomism, which is of course in accordance with the second argument. 
 
Premise (3): Every object is caused or is the cause of one or more other objects 
This premise holds that everything that exists is caused by another object or is the cause 
of the existence of at least one other object
16
. The disjunction is inclusive. It may be that 
an object is itself caused and is also the cause of one or more other objects. Note that this 
premise implies that mereological universalism is untenable since it follows that the sum 
of all objects is not an object
17
. Premise (3) is reasonable enough to accept as a premise. 
The intuition behind it is that something can only exist if it is part of ‘the causal fabric’ of 
the world. Something that is not caused and that is neither the cause of anything else can 
not exist simply because it does not take part in the all-embracing process of causation. 
Premise (3) is thus grounded in the viewpoint that the world is a causally intertwined 
totality. The world does not contain fully isolated inert objects since reality is a causally 
interweaved unity in which every object participates. So, indeed, as premise (3) holds, 
everything that exists is caused or a cause because reality is a causally connected unity. 
 
Now, one could object that abstract objects are causally inert, that is, they are uncaused 
and they do not cause anything
18
. As such they falsify premise (3). This objection does 
however not have sufficient force. First, there might not be abstract objects, that is, 
nominalism with respect to abstract objects could be true. Nominalism regarding abstract 
objects, i.e. the viewpoint that all objects are concrete objects, is surely a defensible 
position. Due to space limitations this point is not further discussed. Second, even if there 
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are abstract objects, one could argue that they are all caused and therefore do not falsify 
premise (3). After all, concepts and propositions are paradigmatic examples of abstract 
objects. Concepts and propositions such as 'bicycle', 'elevator' and 'The bicycle is in the 
elevator' are certainly plausibly understood as being the product of human thought and 
therefore as being caused. The same can be maintained for other classes of abstract 
objects, such as the objects of mathematics. One could plausibly argue that mathematical 
objects are caused by a specific activity of human thought, namely abstraction from or 
idealization of concrete objects in nature. This line of thought can be further extended, 
that is, it can be defended that all abstract objects are man-made artifacts and thus caused. 
Note that this line of thought collapses into a defense of nominalism with respect to 
abstract objects if one contend that humans can only cause concrete objects, i.e. mental 
contents or material states of affairs. Third, even if some abstract objects, such as sets, are 
uncaused, it might be the case that they are the originating cause of other abstract objects. 
One could for example argue that sets are the originating cause of numbers since numbers 
are mathematically ‘constructed’ from sets. So, in that case, uncaused abstract objects are 
causes and therefore they do not falsify premise (3). Fourth, suppose that there are 
causally inert abstract objects after all. In that specific case one could recast the new first 
cause argument presented in this paper by replacing all occurrences of 'object' by 
'concrete object', i.e. by limiting the domain of discourse to concrete objects
19
. The 
conclusion of the new argument would then be that there is a unique concrete uncaused 
cause whose effect is ontologically prior to every other concrete caused object. Such an 
object definitely qualifies as a first cause in a metaphysically interesting non-trivial sense. 
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Premise (4): The sum of all caused simple objects, if not empty, is an object 
Additional terminology is required to justify the premise that the sum of all caused simple 
objects, if not empty, is itself an object. Koslicki (2008) defines kinds as ‘categories or 
taxonomic classifications into which particular objects may be grouped on the basis of 
shared characteristics of some sort’. In her book Koslicki provides examples of kinds, 
such as 'objects that are currently in my visual field'. 'children born on a Tuesday', 
'objects that can be used either as doorstops or as cleaning supplies', 'chairs', 'bachelors', 
'janitors', 'hunters', 'electrons', 'water', 'planets', 'diamonds', 'tigers', 'cats' and 'gold'. Now, 
some kinds are natural kinds. Natural kinds are kinds that are rooted in some underlying 
structural uniform regularity out there in nature. There is no single conclusive answer to 
the question how to decide which kinds are natural. Still, in the literature criteria are 
proposed for the identification of kinds plausibly thought of as being natural. In what 
follows the criteria examined in Koslicki (2008) are captured. First, a natural kind is not 
‘arbitrary, heterogeneous or gerrymandered’. Second, the members of a natural kind have 
much more features in common than just the features already present in (or logically 
implied by) the definition of that kind. So, natural kinds are such that we continuously 
discover previously unforeseen common features.  In other words, a natural kind is a kind 
for which its specification does not capture everything that is true about its members. 
Third, natural kinds ‘provide grounds for legitimate inductive inferences concerning the 
members in question’. Fourth, natural kinds are expected to figure in the laws and in the 
explanations of science. These criteria are best understood as follows. The more criteria 
are met by a given kind, the more plausibly that kind is thought of as being a natural kind. 
The earlier mentioned kinds 'the objects that are currently in my visual field', 'children 
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born on a Tuesday' and 'the objects that can be used either as doorstops or as cleaning 
supplies' meet none of the above criteria and are thus plausibly rejected as being 
examples of natural kinds. The kinds ‘chair’, ‘bachelor’, 'janitor' and 'hunter' meet the 
first criterion, but not the other three, and are therefore not plausibly thought of as being 
natural either. On the other hand, the kinds 'electron', 'water', 'planet', 'diamond', 'tiger', 
'cat' and 'gold' all meet the first three criteria. Besides, most (if not all) of them also 
satisfy the fourth criterion. So, these seven examples are plausibly understood as being 
natural kinds.  
 
Now, the notion of a demarcated natural kind is introduced. A demarcated natural kind is 
a natural kind for which it holds that membership is not vague, i.e. the specification of 
that natural kind is such that it is never unclear whether a given object is a member of that 
natural kind or not. With respect to kind membership there are no indeterminate cases if 
the natural kind in question is a demarcated natural kind. The boundaries of a demarcated 
natural kind are not vague, i.e. we can draw a clear unambiguous principled line between 
what counts as a member and what does not count as a member. Of the seven examples 
of natural kinds only 'electron', 'water' and 'gold' seem to be demarcated natural kinds. 
After all, biological species such as tigers and cats are, according to Darwinism, not 
demarcated. Also, there is no explicit definition of what counts as a planet or a diamond. 
 
The mereological sum of the members of a demarcated natural kind is properly defined 
since there is a clear unambiguous line between what does and what does not count as a 
member of the kind in question. Such a sum is not problematic in other ways either since 
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the objects in the sum do not overlap each other, i.e., they are all mutually disjoint. ‘We 
are simply aggregating concrete particulars’ to utilize a phrase from Koons (1997).  Now, 
the sum of all the members of a demarcated natural kind is best understood as being an 
object itself, i.e. the relation between the totality of members of a demarcated natural 
kind and each of the individual members of that kind is best understood as the relation 
between a whole and its parts
20
. As an example one could take the case of water. The 
totality of all water molecules in the universe counts plausibly as an object that can be 
referred to as 'the water in the universe' or 'the universe's water'. Surely, the fact that 
currently the water molecules are spatially spread across the entire universe does not 
make the totality of water molecules any less a concrete particular whole than if all the 
water molecules would be spatially ‘packed together’. Thus, the spatial structure of the 
universe's water might change, but it is still ‘the water of our universe’, or, ‘the universe's 
water’, i.e. an object amongst other objects. 
 
Now, the caused simples are a kind, its definition being 'the objects that are both caused 
and simple'. Surely, this kind is a natural kind. First, it is not arbitrary or gerrymandered. 
Second, the properties of the caused simples are not exhausted by being simple and being 
caused. After all, the discipline of string theory (or any future discipline having the basic 
building blocks of reality as its subject) is concerned with nothing less than an in-depth 
understanding of all the properties of the ultimate constituents of our universe. Thus, if 
the common features of the caused simples would be nothing more than being caused and 
simple, string theory (or any subsequent future discipline having the ultimate constituents 
of the world as its object) would be a rather empty idle discipline, which it surely is not. 
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Third, the kind of caused simples is plausibly not a conventionalistic or nominalistic type 
of classification, since being caused and being simple refers to some realistic regularity or 
uniformity in nature. Therefore, the kind of caused simples provides sufficient ground for 
inductive inferences. Fourth, as already mentioned, the kind of caused simples plays a 
quite important role in science, i.e. in the quest for the most fundamental laws of nature, 
and in scientific explanations (such as, nowadays, within string theory). It follows that the 
caused simples adhere to all four discussed identification criteria for natural kinds. So, it 
is sufficiently reasonable to maintain that the caused simples are a natural kind. 
 
It is now shown that the caused simples are in fact a demarcated natural kind. Consider 
the definition of the natural kind in question, i.e. ‘objects that are both caused and 
simple’. This specification is unambiguously clear. After all, the existence of each given 
object is either caused or uncaused, and every given object either does or does not contain 
a proper part. Thus, according to the aforementioned principle, that is, the principle that 
the sum of all the members of a demarcated natural kind is an object, the sum of the 
caused simples, if not empty, is an object, which is what is stated by the fourth premise. 
 
Premise (5): The cause of an object is disjoint with that object 
The premise that the cause of an object is disjoint with that object is justified, since, 
within the context at issue, causing an object’s existence, its negation would have highly 
counter-intuitive, if not to say rather absurd, consequences. Plausibly, the cause of the 
existence of an object is ontologically prior to that object and each of its parts. So, if an 
object’s cause would not be disjoint with the caused object, it would follow that the cause 
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of the object is prior to a part of itself, which seems impossible. Nothing is prior to a part 
of itself. Therefore the cause of an object is disjoint with that object. A caused object and 
its cause have a ‘separate existence’ (Koons 1997). So, they do not share a common part. 
 
Premise (6): Every caused composite object contains a caused proper part 
According to the sixth premise each caused composite object contains a caused proper 
part. This seems to be a reasonable premise as well. Surely, at last one of the proper parts 
of a caused composite is itself caused. It is now shown that the sixth premise is indeed 
justified. Suppose, for reductio, that there is some caused composite, let’s call it N, for 
which none of its proper parts are caused. Thus, each and every proper part of N is an 
uncaused object. In that case N’s proper parts taken together, i.e. the totality of the proper 
parts of N, is not caused either. Now, because of the principles of supplementation and 
composition-as-identity
21
, the mereological sum of the proper parts of object N simply is 
object N. This implies that N is also uncaused, which contradicts the initial assumption. 
Therefore, this assumption needs to be rejected, i.e. every caused composite contains at 
least one caused proper part, which is what is stated by the sixth premise. 
 
Closing remarks 
As argued above each of the six premises of the new argument is justified for the context 
in question, i.e. causation with respect to bringing about the existence of an object. It was 
already shown that the premises logically imply that there is a first cause. Thus, the new 
argument seems a good argument, i.e. its conclusion follows deductively from justified 
premises. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the proposed new argument 
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does not depend on metaphysical modal notions, such as those of metaphysical or broadly 
logical possibility and necessity. In this respect it is, as said earlier, wholly different from 
the other new contemporary first cause arguments
22
. One could argue that it is beneficial 
not to depend on metaphysical modal concepts because hitherto there is hardly consensus 
of opinion on their meaning. For example David Lewis, Alvin Plantinga and Theodore 
Sider each offer different accounts of the nature and characteristics of metaphysical 
possibility and necessity (Rocca 2010). As explained in the introduction, the primary aim 
of this paper was to show that, atomism and causalism together imply the existence of a 
first cause if some very generic and sensible conditions regarding the nature of parthood, 
composition and causality are accepted. Thus, to conclude, a commitment to a first cause 
comes quite naturally with a commitment to the viewpoints of atomism and causalism. 
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1
 In this paper a first cause argument is understood as an argument for the existence of a first cause that 
reasons from there being (caused or contingent) objects. The Kalam argument and the fine-tuning argument 
are not first cause arguments. First, they reason respectively from the claim that the universe began a finite 
time ago or that the cosmological constants are fine-tuned. Moreover, they only establish that the physical 
universe is caused and not that there is an origin of everything (including possibly ‘non-physical’ objects). 
2 Leibniz presents his argument in The Monadology, in On the Ultimate Origin of Things, in The Theodicy 
and in The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason. See Craig (1980) for an overview.  
3
 In the introduction to the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology W.L. Craig and J.P. Moreland write: 
‘The collapse of positivism and its attendant verification principle of meaning was undoubtedly the most 
important philosophical event of the twentieth century. Their demise heralded a resurgence of metaphysics, 
along with other traditional problems of philosophy that verification had suppressed’ (Craig and Moreland 
2009). 
4
 Surely, the thesis of causalism as understood in this paper does not rule out there being objects that are 
caused and that are the cause of one or more other objects. 
5
 It might perhaps be worthwhile to notice that, traditionally, the viewpoints of atomism and causalism are 
predominantly associated with materialistic or naturalistic worldviews that categorically deny the existence 
of a first cause. The argument developed in this paper thus shows that such an association is problematic.  
6
 Respectively ‘For any contingently true proposition, it is logically or conceptually possible that it has an 
explanation’ (Gale and Pruss 1999) and ‘All explainable true propositions have explanations’ (Pruss 2004). 
7
 Respectively ‘Every wholly contingent fact or situation normally has a cause’ (Koons 1997) and 
‘Normally, for any intrinsic property p that (i) can begin to be exemplified and (ii) can be exemplified by 
something that has a cause, there can be a cause of p’s beginning to be exemplified’ (Rasmussen 2010). 
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8
 The concept of being ontologically prior is difficult to explicate. In this paper an object X is considered 
ontologically prior to an object Y in case the existence of Y is not required for X to exist but the existence 
of X is required for Y to exist. It is taken that the cause is ontologically prior to its effect and that a part is 
ontologically prior to the whole. 
9
 A principle that could be assumed here is that a sum of objects only counts as an object in case it causes 
as a whole another object, or, if it was caused as a whole. In fact, this seems to be an intuitively plausible 
principle. Moreover, the third premise of the proposed new argument that is presented later on in this paper 
does actually amount to a closely related (yet different) principle. 
10
 Here the same intuition is applied as mentioned in the previous footnote. 
11
 The Special Composition Question concerns the nature of composite objects. It was raised by van 
Inwagen and can be more precisely formulated as: ‘For any collection of objects, what are the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for there being an object composed of those objects?’. (van Inwagen 1990) 
12
 For example, an enumeration of all the sets of objects for which it is true that they compose a further 
object would certainly not count as a concise natural answer. Examples of concise natural answers include 
the view that some objects compose a further object if and only if they are ‘fastened together’ and the view 
that some objects compose a further object if and only if ‘their activities constitute a single life’. Van 
Inwagen discusses both views. He rejects the former view and argues for the latter. (van Inwagen 1990) 
13
 The truth-functional connective ‘or’ is an inclusive disjunction instead of an exclusive one. Thus, the 
third premise does not rule out objects that are caused and that are the cause of one or more other objects. 
14
 If the mereological sum of all caused simple objects is empty (i.e. if there are no caused simple objects), 
then obviously this sum is not an object. Therefore, the fourth premise requires the sum to be non-empty. 
15
 In fact Schaffer argues that there is no evidence for the existence of a ‘fundamental level’. Yet, for him 
this amounts to there being no evidence for atomism: ‘[…] the question of the evidence for fundamentality 
is best understood as the question: What is the evidence for mereological atoms?’ (2003, p. 500). 
16
 This principle is mentioned and accepted already by Aristotle: “Everything has an origin or is an origin” 
(Physics 203b6). A variant of it can be found in Plato’s The Sofist. In this dialogue the stranger says: ‘My 
notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by 
another, if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real 
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existence’ (Project Gutenberg, Benjamin Jowett translation). The principle that everything that exists is a 
cause or has a cause is related to a contemporary position within the philosophy of science known as 
causalism. Causalists such as N. Cartwright argue ‘that we are entitled to speak of the reality of [objects] 
because we know that they have quite specific causal powers’ (Hacking 1983). The exact opposite of the 
principle that everything that exists is caused or a cause is the principle of existence from Parmenides of 
Elea. Parmenides maintains that something exists if and only if it is uncaused and not itself a cause. The 
intuition behind Parmenides’ principle is that something can only exist if it is completely changeless and 
that being caused or being a cause implies change. The principle of existence from Parmenides is surely 
problematic since it implies that none of the regular objects in our world, such as tables and chairs, exist. 
17
 It is not difficult to show that this is indeed the case if we use premise (5), that is, the premise that the 
cause of the existence of an object is disjoint with that object. Now, the sum of all objects cannot be caused 
and can neither be the cause of another object because such a cause or effect would have to be disjoint with 
all objects taken together. This is impossible since there is nothing outside the sum of all objects.   
18
 Both Rene van Woudenberg and Jeroen de Ridder pointed to this specific objection. 
19
 This suggestion was provided by Jeroen de Ridder. 
20
 It is required to restrict this claim to demarcated natural kinds. First, the sums of the members of non-
natural kinds, e.g. 'children born on a Tuesday' or 'objects that are currently in my visual field' are not 
plausibly understood as objects. The claim that these sums are objects would imply that even more 
gerrymandered sums, such as the sum of the bottom of the statue of liberty and three atoms in the handlebar 
of some bicycle, or the sum of the handlebar of a bicycle and one or more atoms in someone’s left hand, 
etc., would also count as objects, which is unreasonably counterintuitive. Moreover, as is shown earlier in 
this paper, the third premise of the new argument implies that mereological universalism is false. Second, 
the sums of the members of non-demarcated natural kinds (such as tigers or cats according to Darwinism) 
are not plausibly understood as objects either. So, a restriction to natural kinds merely does not suffice. 
21
 Both principles have been introduced and discussed earlier in this paper. 
22
  i.e. those of Koons (1997), Gale and Pruss (1999) and Rasmussen (2010). 
